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REVISING THE CANON: FEMINIST HELP
IN TEACHING PROCEDURE
Judith Resnik"
Anything may happen when womanhood has ceased to be a
protected profession, I thought, opening the door.
VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 41 (1929).
In the first decades after women gained access to studying and
teaching law, the understanding of "women's issues" was that these
issues arose under discrete topics of inquiry-such as family law and
sex discrimination. I Over the past decade, however, feminists
within the legal academy have thought about the relationship be-
tween feminism and the first year law school curriculum.2 In 1992, I
was the chair of the Section on Procedure of the American Associa-
tion of Law Schools (AALS), and in conjunction with the Section on
Women in Legal Education, we hosted a program, Feminist Proce-
dure, at the annual meeting of the AALS. This symposium is the
result. All of us who participated joined in thinking about the rela-
tionships and cross-currents between feminism and procedure. As
is plain from the other essays from the symposium published here,
there is a wealth of material from which to draw.
Both subjects, feminism and procedure, make the work of this
symposium complex. Feminist theories are multiple, as women of
all colors, classes, and sexual identities learn not to equate their own
experiences with those of all women. 1I Similarly, to talk about pro-
• All rights reserved. Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, University of Southern
California Law Center. Many thanks to my co-panelists, Shirley Abrahamson, Barbara
Babcock, Mary Becker, Linda Greene, Harold Koh, and Liz Schneider, and to Christine
Carr, Veronica Gentilli, Angela Johnson, and Denny Curtis for their thoughts on these
issues. This essay is based on a speech, given at the annual meetings of the American
Association of Law Schools in January, 1992. In a few instances, I have updated the
materials presented.
I. Thus, as a beginning teacher, I was counseled against teaching such courses, for
were I to do so, I would be viewed as something of a "lightweight." See Judith Resnik,
Visible on Womens Issues, 77 IOWA L. REV. 44 (1991).
2. The American Association of Law School's (AALS) Section on Women in Legal
Education-often in conjunction with other sections of the AALS-has sponsored
programs and workshops on feminism and contracts, feminism and criminal law,
feminism and property, and feminism and torts. For an overview of the breadth of
feminist legal scholarship, see Paul M. George & Susan McGlamery, Women and Legal
Scholarship: A Bibliography, 77 IOWA L. REV. 87 (1991).
3. See, e.g., PATRICIA H. COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 201-20 (1991); ELIZABETH V.
SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988);
Linda Gordon, On "Difference," 10 GENDERS 91 (1991).
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cedure as if it were a single topic is impossible. However, rather
than limit the conversation by insisting on a specific focus within
either subject, the essays here relate to a myriad of issues that affect
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, judges, as well as questions of
representational obligations and rights, remedies, jurisdiction, sov-
ereignty, and courts-all in the feminist context.
In my role of "introducer," I focus on three issues: the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts, the institutional identities of those courts,
and federal rulemaking, all of which are understood as central to
procedure but are not so readily understood as relevant to feminist
theory-or feminist theory relevant to them. As one of my proce-
dure colleagues put it, "what possible relevance does feminism have
to the topic of jurisdiction?" My task, in this brief overview,4 is to
respond to this question by sketching some of the intersections. I
begin with the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.
At the very end of 1991, William Rehnquist, ChiefJustice of the
United States Supreme Court, gave his annual Year-End Report on
the FederalJudiciary;5 in that speech, he raised the question of what
position the United States judiciary should take toward then pend-
ing<> (and-as of this writing-still pending7) legislation: The Vio-
lence Against Women Act. As described by its sponsors, the Act is
drafted in response to the "national tragedy" that makes women the
victims of violence in their homes, workplaces, and on the streets.8
The Act has many provisions, including the establishment of a Na-
tional Commission on Violent Crime Against Women,9 funding for
state programs on violence,1O promoting safer college campuses, 11
and the funding of circuit-by-circuit studies of the effects of gender
on the federal system.l 2
4. For development of these issues, see Judith Resnik, Ambivalence: The Resiliency of
United States Legal Culture, 45 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993) [hereinafter Ambivalence];
Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA.
L. REV. 909 (1990) [hereinafter Housekeeping]; Judith Resnik, Naturally Without Gender:
Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.V. L. REV. 1682 (1991) [hereinafter
Naturally Without Gender].
5. William H. Rehnquist, ChiefJustice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary,
24 THE THIRD BRANCH 1 (1992).
6. S. 15, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) ("Violence Against Women Act of 1991").
7. S. II, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)("Violence Against Women Act of 1993").
8. For discussion of street harassment, see also Cynthia G. Bowman, Street
Harassment and the 1nformal Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1993).
9. S. 11 Title I, § 141; S. 15 Title I, § 141.
10. S. 11 Title I, § 121; S. 15 Title I, § 121.
II. S. 11 Title IV; S. 15 Title IV.
12. S. 11 Title V; S. 15 Title V.
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But what caught the eye of the federal judiciary were the two juris-
dictional provisions of the Violence Against Women Act. One
would provide a federal civil rights remedy to a person who is the
victim ofa "crime of violence, motivated by gender."I!! The second
would create a federal crime when a person travels across state lines
for the purpose of "harassing, intimidating or injuring a spouse or
intimate partner...."14 In the fall of 1991, the Judicial Conference
of the United States reviewed a report of a special ad hoc committee
that had been appointed to study the legislation. That report con-
cluded that, while the Judicial Conference believed the federal judi-
ciary should playa "constructive role in offering its assistance to
Congress in an effort to fashion an appropriate response to the vio-
lence directed against women," litigation arising from that violence
was "better handled in the state courts."15 Providing federal juris-
diction would, according to the 1991 report, "embroil the federal
courts in domestic relations disputes" and "flood [the federal
courts] with cases that have been traditionally in the province of the
states." 16 Relying in his 1991 year end report on the conclusions of
this Committee, ChiefJustice Rehnquist in turn urged Congress to
attend to the views of the Judicial Conference, opposing the
legislation. 17
A central issue for all proceduralists is jurisdiction. The Violence
Against Women Act straightforwardly links jurisdictional bounda-
ries and gender. The proposed statute provides federal jurisdiction
for gender-based offenses; it would enhance women's access to
13. S. II Title III, § 301; S. 15 Title III, § 301. The congressional discussion in
support of the section noted that, while federal remedies currently exist for gender-
based discrimination in the work place, there are none for gender crimes on the streets
or in the home. See 136 CONGo REC. S 8263 Uune ll, 1990), S 16090 (Oct. 19, 1990)
(statements of Senator Joseph Biden introducing the legislation).
14. S. II Title II, § 2261; S. 15 Title II, § 2261.
15. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE 6 (Sept. 1991) (on file with the author) [hereinafter 1991 REPORT ON GENDER-
BASED VIOLENCE].
16. [d. at I, 7. In March of 1993, the Judicial Conference of the United States
changed its position, based on new work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based
Violence, now chaired by the Honorable Stanley Marcus of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida. In light of "the dialogue" that the
Committee had begun with the bill's sponsors, the Conference voted to take "no
position on specific provisions" of the act. In other words, while the Conference
"reiterate[d] its concern ... about the trend toward federalization of state law crimes
and courses of action," the Conference no longer specifically opposes Title Ill's
jurisdictional provisions. See Judicial Conference Resolution on Violence Against
Women (March 1993) (on file with the author). Further, the Conference endorsed Title
V of the legislation, which encourages "circuit judicial councils to conduct studies with
respect to gender bias in their respective tribunals." [d.
17. Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 1-2.
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courts to claim injuries suffered on account of gender. IS The oppo-
nents of the bill discuss their objections in terms that are also
gendered: that certain kinds of cases (involving families in general
and women subject to violence occurring within the family in partic-
ular) are not those that fall within the preserve of the federal courts,
whose scarce judicial resources must (according to the ChiefJustice)
be reserved for "issues where important national interests
predominate." 19
The Violence Against Women Act is not the only example that
links gender with jurisdiction. In fact, the topic is familiar to readers
of women's history, but unfortunately less familiar to students of
procedure. The historical antecedents are that married women
were, until relatively recently, without the capacity to litigate in fed-
eral or state courts. In fact, the juridical capacity of women to be
litigants was a topic that used to appear, as such, in early hornbooks
on the federal courts and procedure.20 Further, married women still
suffer some juridical disabilities; the jurisdictions that retain the
"marital rape exception" treat married women differently from sin-
gle women for purposes of litigation.21
It is not only the history and contemporary issues about women's
access to courts that demonstrate the relevance of feminism to juris-
diction; the Violence Against Women Act also exemplifies the idea
that differential access to federal and state courts can be seen
18. While the text is "gender-neutral"-that is, both women and men could file
claims under the proposed legislation-the drafters explain that they are writing to
respond to the injuries suffered by women, who are disproportionately the victims of
violence. See 137 CONGo REC. S 597-98 (Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Senator Joseph
Biden).
19. Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 2.
20. See, e.g., ROGER FOSTER, FEDERAL PRACTICE IN CIVtL CASES 91-92 (1892) ("In the
courts of the United States ... the rule [in equity] was early laid down as follows:
'Where the wife complains of the husband and asks relief against him she must use the
name of some other person in prosecuting the suit; but where the acts of the husband
are not complained of, he would seem to be the most suitable person to unite with her in
suit. This is a matter of practice within the discretion of the court.' ") (quoting Bein v.
Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228, 240 (1848)).
21. Until 1992, federal military law retained this exception. Members of the
Committee on Armed Services voted to "remov[e] ... limitations relating to gender and
marital relationship." 138 CONGo REC. No. 138-Part II H10266, H10337-38 (Oct. I,
1992); see Pub. L. No. 102-484, 1066(c), 106 Stat. 2506 (1992). The former law, 10
U.S.C. § 920(a) (1988), provided that "Any person subject to this chapter who commits
an act of sexual intercourse with a female not his wife, by force and without her consent,
is guilty of rape... ." See also United States V. Wilhite, 28 MJ. 884, 885 (A.F.C.M.R.
1989) ("Carnal knowledge under [this section] requires, as an essential element, proof
that the victim is not the accused's wife."); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Michie 1988)
(subheading IX details when and how a wife might "unilaterally revoke her implied
consent to marital sex").
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through the lens of gender. The 1991 Ad Hoc Judicial Conference
Committee argued that "domestic relations disputes" belonged to
the state courts. Since women are identified with the "domestic
sphere," such an argument has particular import for women, whose
work and life are understood as bound up with that world. The un-
spoken assumption was that the federal courts do not and should
not handle issues relating to family life, while the state courts both
do and should have such jurisdiction.
The same unspoken assumption is evident from other voices
within the federal judicial community. As is familiar to procedural-
ists, in 1988, Congress chartered the Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee (FCSC) and charged that group with thinking about the federal
courts in the coming century.22 In the spring of 1990, the FCSC
issued its report. One chapter of that report was entitled "Discrimi-
nation in the Courts."23 In that chapter, the FCSC Report noted
that there have been many studies of gender bias in the state system,
and that those studies have, in fact, found gender bias to be a prob-
lem in judicial proceedings. The federal report then commented:
Although we have confidence that the quality of the federal
bench and the nature of federal law keep such problems to a
minimum, it is unlikely that the federal judiciary is totally ex-
empt from instances of this general social problem.24
The FCSC concluded that a study of such problems in the federal
system was not needed, but that awareness and education would be
appropriate.
As Justice Shirley Abrahamson discusses in her essay,25 since the
1980s, some thirty jurisdictions have put gender, ethnic, and racial
bias in the courts on their agendas; more than twenty have issued
reports about gender bias in the courts.26 While the generic phrase
for the discussion is "gender bias," the focus has been on the
problems of women, who disproportionately suffer the burdens of
22. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 101-
109,102 Stat. 4642, 4644-46 (codified temporarily at 28 U.S.C. § 331 note (1988)).
23. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter FCSC Report].
24. [d. at 169 (emphasis added).
25. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Feminist Jurisprudence and Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV.
1209 (1993).
26. For further discussion, see Resnik, Ambivalence, supra note 4. See also Judith
Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993). For a list
of task force reports available as of this writing, see the Appendix to this article. The
National Center for State Courts (NCSC) is a clearinghouse for information and reports
on these issues. See generally NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (1990).
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harms predicated on gender. New York State's task force's conclu-
sion is exemplary of what these reports have documented:
[G]ender bias against women .. ~ is a pervasive problem with
grave consequences .... Women uniquely, disproportion-
ately and with unacceptable frequency must endure a climate
of condescension, indifference and hostility.27
Given the powerful and distressing findings by state courts, it is
intriguing to consider the difference in the approaches of the state
and federal systems. During the 1980s, many states began to study
the issue; in 1988, the ChiefJustices ofall the state courts adopted a
resolution calling for study of gender, racial, and ethnic bias.28 In
contrast, until the 1990s, national bodies speaking on behalf of the
federal courts have appeared disinterested in the issues.29 In 1988
(the same year that all of the state Chief Justices were calling for
study of gender, racial, and ethnic bias in their courts), the FCSC
Report wrote that the "quality of the federal bench and the nature
of federal law" keep these problems minimal, and study of the issues
in the federal system was therefore not necessary. Not until 1993
did the Judicial Conference of the United States vote to endorse the
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act that would fund gen-
der bias studies circuit by circuit.30
What is it about the "nature" of the federal courts that makes
such a view supportable? The FCSC Report's language captured a
widely held sentiment, expressed again by the ChiefJustice of the
United States in his 1991 year-end speech, and shared by many fed-
eral judges and scholars-that intrinsic and essential to the very
subjects of federal law and the jurisdiction of the national courts is
work that has not much to do with women and the problems we
face. The obvious questions are: Why? What in the nature of the
27. Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts. 15 FORDHAM URB. LJ. II.
17-18 (1986-87).
28. Conference of ChiefJustices Resolution XVIII, Task Force on Gender Bias and
Minority Concerns. 26 CT. REV. 5 (Fall 1989). In 1993, the Conference of ChiefJustices
reaffirmed this position and called for implememation of reforms. In 1993, the Chief
Justices of the State Couns renewed their commitmem to this effon and called for
implememation of reforms. Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution Urging Funher
Effons for Equal Treatmem of All Persons (adopted Jan. 28,1993) (on file with author).
29. In 1990, two circuits commiued themselves to such inquiry. The Ninth Circuit
authorized a task force (of which I am a member), and that body reponed to the 1992
Annual Judicial Conference of the Nimh Circuil. See The Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task
Force, Preliminary Report, Executive Summary, STAN. L. REV. (fonhcoming 1993) [hereinafter
Ninth Circuit Executive Summary]. The full preliminary repon of the Circuit is available
from that Circuit's Executive's office. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has also commissioned work, now underway, on gender and racial bias in that Circuit's
couns.
30. See supra note 16.
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workplace, ideology, or jurisdiction of the federal courts might sup-
port such a conclusion? In my view,31 women are both materially
present and important in the federal courts, but absent in the ideol-
ogy of federal courts jurisprudence. We are present in law as liti-
gants, in the working spaces as employees, but conceptually absent
and not paid much attention to. But there is nothing "natural"
about either our presence or our absence. Both are constructed out
of the decisions of legislators, presidents, judges, lawyers, and
litigants.
With feminist concerns in mind, we who are proceduralists should
ask about the history of the distinctions drawn between federal and
state jurisdiction. One relevant source for the delineation between
court systems is the development over the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries of the ideology that women and men inhabit "separate
spheres." The effort to situate women in the domestic, allegedly
private sphere of the home, and to place men in the economic mar-
ketplace influences the discussion today of the boundaries of federal
jurisdiction and of what constitutes a "national interest." The sepa-
rate spheres ideology also obscures understanding of the relevance
of federal litigation to the lives of women.
I will not here catalogue the breadth of federal laws that bring
women in as federal litigants, but let me note a few. It is not only
the high visibility so-called "women's cases," such as litigation
about reproductive freedom, Title VII, and equal protection, but
also a host of other kinds of cases, ranging from immigration law to
the $2 billion Dalkon Shield case (emerging out of the injuries done
to women's bodies) to consumer bankruptcies in which, according
to one study, women are seventy-five percent of the claimants, filing
either singly or jointly.32
Women are in the federal courts, and the fact offamily status does
not define us as litigants. Moreover, in fact the federal courts do
have a lot to do with family life. Mary Becker, Sylvia Law, and
others have written about the constitutionalization of family law.33 I
want to underscore that it is not only constitutional issues that draw
the federal courts into family life; a host of federal statutory laws
define and structure economic relations among family members.
We do not typically call these "family law" but rather tax law, pen-
31. Explained in detail in Naturally Without Gender, supra note 4, at 1730-50.
32. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN, & JAY L. WESTERBROOK, As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 146-65 (1989).
33. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and
Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1989);
Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984).
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sion law, and federal benefits law. All, however, have direct and
specific effects on family life.34 Federal immigration law judges
sometimes have to decide whether wives have been battered; federal
bankruptcy judges deal with community property and ownership of
assets of divorcing spouses. Moreover, federal courts have authority
over members of the military and claim power over members of In-
dian tribes. It is time for us to understand and to name the wealth
of "federal laws of the family."35
Why should proceduralists care about federal laws of the family
and when might we teach these topics? In discussing federal and
state court jurisdiction, we may well tell our students about some-
thing called the "domestic relations exception" to diversity jurisdic-
tion.36 We might recount that many federal judges and
commentators have claimed that issues of family law are the prov-
ince of the state courts; federal courts should not intrude. We might
examine the relationship between the "domestic relations excep-
tion" and other doctrines of abstention, in which federal courts de-
cline to hear the merits of claims on the grounds that state courts
(or Indian tribunals) are better situated to decide them. We might
question the assumptions that locate family issues as "naturally"
within the work of state courts, and the assumptions that locate wo-
men as primarily within families. We might discuss the special bur-
dens that family status has placed on women as litigants. We could
note that women lost their juridical voice by gaining the status of
being married, and thus this fact is not of historical interest alone.
Not only do some jurisdictions continue to place disabilities on mar-
ried women, but an argument mounted against the Violence Against
Women Act has been that married women seeking divorce will be
overly aggressive litigants, retaliating against spouses by dragging
them into federal court under the proposed new jurisdictional
provisions.37
34. See, e.g., Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991) (analyzing effects of
state property regimes on federal marital property rules under ERISA).
35. See Naturally Without Gender, supra note 4, at 1721-30.
36. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2212-15 (1992) (holding that the
exception is a court-implied, statutorily based limitation on federal court diversity
jurisdiction and applies only to cases involving divorce, child custody, and alimony).
37. In heated exchanges, some judges argued to Senator Biden that a federal civil
rights cause of action based on violence motivated by gender would "add a new count to
many if not most divorce and other domestic relations cases." Letter from Vincent L.
McKusick, President of the Conference of ChiefJustices, to Sen. Biden (Feb. 22, 1991)
(on file with author). In the course of the exchanges, Senator Biden responded: "Not
only have you improperly read the statute, your comments verge dangerously close to
the kind of stereotypes we condemn. To put the collective force of the federal judiciary
behind the assumption that women-unlike other groups-will file false and vindictive
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Moreover, we who teach procedure can talk about the data devel-
oped from the gender, ethnic, and race bias task forces, of the
problems that women of all colors have as litigants in courtrooms
across the nation. More than twenty reports document that women
as witnesses face special hurdles; their credibility is readily ques-
tioned, their claims of injury undervalued.38 In the fall of 1991, dur-
ing the televised proceedings on the nomination of Clarence
Thomas to be a Supreme Court]ustice, gender and racial stereotyp-
ing abounded;39 if Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill could not es-
cape such stereotypes, it is not surprising that few ordinary litigants
do.40
In short, to understand and teach about federal jurisdiction, the
doctrine and case law of abstention, the divisions between the fed-
eral and state judiciaries, and the interactions among judges, liti-
gants, lawyers, and jurors within the courtroom, one needs to know
about the history of exclusion of women from legal life and about
the contemporary literature offeminism. The image of women's ab-
civil rights claims suggests the very gender-biased stereotypes that my legislation was
intended, in part, to dispel." Letter from Sen. Biden to Hon. Thomas M. Reavely, then
Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Biased Violence of the judicial Conference
(Sept. 20, 1991) (footnote omitted) (on file with author).
38. Twenty-two of 23 jurisdictions that have published gender bias task force reports
have addressed questions of credibility, as parts of discussions of domestic violence,
sexual assault, courtroom interaction, and rights sought by women litigants under
employment and federal benefits law. Many of the reports detail the specific problems
faced by women testifying about sexual aggression. Illustrative is the finding of the
District of Columbia that "cross-examination of victims tends to be more hostile in
sexual assault cases than in other assault cases." TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS REPORT,
in THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS AND OF THE TASK
FORCE REPORT ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 119 (District of Columbia, 1992); see also
COLORADO SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, GENDER &
JUSTICE IN THE COLORADO COURTS 92 (1990); GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS: A
REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA BY THE COMMISSION ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 93-94 (1991); REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT 107-08 (Mass. 1989); THE 1990 REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON
GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 106 (1990). For the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force,
credibility of women as witnesses emerged as a serious concern from inquiries in several
areas, including federal benefits, immigration, and employment law. The Task Force
learned that women's testimony may simply be thought to be complaints about life,
rather than as legally cognizable harms, and that, even when believed, women's injuries
may be trivialized or viewed as not "worth much" in monetary terms. NINTH CIRCUIT
GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT 70-71, 97-103, 110-11 (1992)
[hereinafter NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS PRELIMINARY REPORT]; see also Lucie E. White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Suroival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38
BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
39. See Toni Morrison, Introduction in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER (Toni
Morrison ed., 1992).
40. See judith Resnik, Who Cares? The Burdens of Thinking About Injuries Done to Women,
in RACE, GENDER AND POWER IN AMERICA (Anita Hill & Emma C. jordan eds.,
forthcoming 1994).
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sence from the federal courts is fueled by nineteenth century as-
sumptions that continue to affect twentieth century doctrine on
federal court jurisdiction. The point to be made is not that federal
law governs or should govern all issues of family life. The point is
that there is nothing "natural" about the division of work between
federal and state courts on family law issues.41 Indeed, as Martha
Field has written in an essay on comparative federalism, in Canada,
the national courts have jurisdiction over marriage law.42
Further, feminism informs procedure classes not only by explain-
ing the assumptions that animate the public/private, na-
tional/domestic distinctions drawn in jurisdictional discussions.
Feminism is deeply concerned with issues of "essentialism"-claims
about the nature of woman herself.43 The notion (commonplace in
discussion of federal jurisdiction) that the federal and state court
have "intrinsic" or "essential" jurisdictional boundaries is a familiar
one, but one that engenders deep skepticism among feminists,
acutely aware of how wrong claims about the nature of women have
been.44 Trained to criticize the construction of women's nature,
feminists can hear words like the "essential attributes of judicial
power"45 and the "essential attributes of sovereignty"46 and re-
spond that these are not essential but man-made attributes. Femi-
nists can then seek a conversation about what the boundaries of
state/federal jurisdiction have been and what-such as the "national
41. Of course, to say that family law is not nawrally or empirically the exclusive
domain of state courts and to recognize the breadth of concurrent jurisdiction between
the federal and state courts is not to provide answers to the queslion about how the
federal and states courls should share this jurisdiction. That is another talk.
42. Martha A. Field, The Differing Federalisms of Canada and the United States, 55 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (1992).
43. The concern is with the use of "woman" as a universal category. One aspect is
that the category "woman" is used by men to essentialize women's nature and then to
oppress. A second problem is that the category "woman" is used by white women,
claiming to speak on behalf of women of other colors, and/or by straight women,
claiming 10 speak on behalf of lesbians, or by middle class women, claiming to speak for
lower class women, or by younger women, claiming 10 speak for older women. The
criticism is that first men and then women of relative power have used their platforms to
explain and therefore appropriate, negate, or erase the experiences of women unlike
themselves. See Resnik, Ambivalence, supra note 4.
44. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (upholding an Illinois statute prohibiting women from practicing law, and
stating, "The paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfil the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the creator.").
45. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) (discussing the powers of a non-
Arlicle III tribunal).
46. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U. S. 528, 549 (1985) (analyzing
questions of federalism); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 844 (1976)
(referring to "undoubted allribute of state sovereignty").
HeinOnline -- 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1191 1992-1993
1993] REVISING THE CANON 1191
tragedy of violence against women"-might prompt reframing of
those boundaries. Finally, whatever the jurisdictional allocations
that are created, feminist proceduralists must consider how women
actually fare as litigants, and whether rules of evidence and proce-
dure respond to the documented disabilities that women still face.
In addition to examining the ideology of the jurisdictional divi-
sions between state and federal courts and how women litigants are
treated in courtroom interactions, feminist proceduralists also can
consider the relationship between courts, as workplaces, and women
as judges, staff, and lawyers within those institutions. The demo-
graphic data available provide additional insight into the roles wo-
men play within the courts. As ofJune, 1991, four of the thirteen
federal appellate circuits had no women judges.47 As of that date,
sixty of the ninety-four federal trial courts had no life tenured wo-
menjudges.48 Four federal districts have no women in any judicial
position, including bankruptcy and magistrate judges.49 While wo-
men were a bit better represented in the ranks of bankruptcy judges
and magistrate judges (constituting thirteen and sixteen percent, re-
spectively, as compared with under seven percent of the Article III
judges),50 one cannot conclude that the lower the judicial position,
the more the women. Of the roughly 1100 administrative law
judges in 1991, women were just five percent.51 (The reliance on a
"veteran's preference" operates to provide affirmative action for
men seeking to become ALJs.)
Before one too quickly concludes that the absence of conscious-
ness about gender-related issues stems from an actual physical ab-
sence of women from federal courthouses, let me add there are
many women who work in those federal courthouses, but not as
judges. Ninety-nine percent of all legal secretaries in the federal ju-
diciary system are women. I must also add that, were I creating
rather than compiling these data, I would not have offered them in
the form that I did; women of color are invisible. However, the
Equal Employment Office of the United States Courts, which is my
primary resource, has categories that include women and men, and
then "White, Black, Hispanic, American Indian, [and] handi-
47. THE UNITED STATES COURT DIRECTORY 5, 13, 23-27 (1992). The Directory,
published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, provides
information on Article III active and senior judges, judges in Article I and Article III
specialized courts, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges. See id.
48. [d. at 56-338.
49. /d. at 138-39, 170-71,220-21,323.
50. [d. at 56-338.
51. John C. Holmes, ALJ Update, A Review ofthe Current Role, Status, and Demographics of
the Corps of Administrative Law Judges, 38 FED. B. NEWS &J. 202, 203 (1991).
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capped." So, I can provide nothing about intersectionalities of race,
gender, and other aspects of individuals' identities.52
But I can provide an overview: The federal work forces are excel-
lent examples of women's exclusion and of invisibility. It is not acci-
dental or natural that there are few of us as judges in the federal
judiciary; it is willful selection.53 Given the absence of change in the
percentage of women as Article III judges over the last ten years,
one is also reminded that time is not the critical variable.
Further, female litigants and employees are not the only women
affected by the federal courts. Women as jurors and lawyers also
have special burdens in the federal courts. Barbara Babcock's essay
details rules of exclusion of women fromjuries. 54 The Ninth Circuit
Gender Bias Task Force learned about women as lawyers in the fed-
eral bar: Women are sixteen percent of that bar, as contrasted with
twenty-five percent of major law firms and of the bars of some
states.55 Women lawyers who responded to the Ninth Circuit survey
also reported their experience of the federal courts as a "club"-
and not one much welcoming of them.56 The Task Force heard re-
peatedly of what one woman called an "infra-structure of sexism."57
Once again, the allocation of women lawyers between state and fed-
eral courts is not a "natural" fact but rather the result of a host of
decisions, from law school admissions to law firms' practices.
Lawyers are sometimes also selected by judges to sit on special
committees or to work as special masters. One example is the use,
by the United States Supreme Court, of special masters. Over the
last sixty years, the Court has made such appointments more than
eighty times; none have been women.58 A second example comes
52. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
JUDICIARY EQ.UAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM FOR THE TWELVE-MoNTH PERIOD ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 1990 (Preliminary Report) 8, Table 1 (1990). Linda Greene's
presentation at the AALS Panel on Feminist Procedure analyzed the importance of
intersectionality for proceduralists. See also Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
53. For a further discussion on the appointment of women to the federal bench see
Carl Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap on the Federal Courts, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1237 (1993).
54. Barbara A. Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights AndJury Service, 61 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1139 (1993).
55. NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 38, at 13; see also
Claudia Maclachlan & Rita H.Jensen, Progress Glacialfor Women, Minorities, NAT'L LJ.,Jan.
27, 1992, at 31 (reporting that a national study found that women attorneys comprised
26% of all attorneys at the 250 largest law firms in the country).
56. See NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 38, at 7-88.
57. Ninth Circuit Executive Summary, supra note 29, at 5.
58. Lee Seltman, Appointments of Special Masters to the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit (Feb. 1992) (on file with author).
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from court committees also of specific interest to procedura1ists-
those created pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.59
This act requires that each of the chief justices in the ninety-four
federal district courts appoint groups to advise those courts about
how to draft plans to address delay and costs in civil cases. In 1992,
there were roughly 1700 people on those committees, of whom
under 300 were women. As of 1991, women were sixteen percent of
the members.60 In four districts, no women sat at all.61 The district
with the highest percentage of women, forty percent, was a district
in which a woman was the chief judge and thus in charge of
appointments.62
Thus far, I have flagged gender issues in the jurisdictional divide
between state and federal courts, in the appointment ofjudges and
in the selection of lawyers to serve on judicial committees, in the
courts' roles as employers, and in the courtroom interactions that
define litigants' rights. Yet another place for proceduralists to look,
when understanding the relationships between our subject matter
and feminism, is in the governing rules that structure litigation-in
the federal context, in the Civil and Criminal Rules of Procedure,
the Rules of Evidence, and in the rules that govern bankruptcy and
appellate practice. Both Harold Koh63 and Elizabeth Schneider64
address these issues; again let me offer a few introductory
comments.
Notice how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves help
contribute to the ideology that women are absent from the federal
courts. The Federal Rules and the practice thereunder often make
litigants, both women and men, invisible. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure rarely require or incorporate the participation of lit-
igants in the pretrial process that dominates federal adjudication
and procedure. Many judges manage in federal cases by talking to
lawyers, not to litigants. Since feminist method is to begin with the
experiences of women,65 feminism could be one source from which
to raise questions about the distance at which those whose interests
are at stake-litigants-are placed by the process.
59. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1990).
60. Veronica Gentilli, Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Groups (Feb. 10, 1992)
(prepared for the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force) (on file with author).
61. [d.
62. [d. In the five districts in which women were chief judges, women constituted
27% of those selected to be committee members. [d.
63. Harold H. Koh, Two Cheers/or Feminist Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1201 (1993).
64. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Gendering and Engendering Process, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1223
(1993).
65. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829 (1990).
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An important issue is whether to change such rules in response to
information developed by gender, race, and ethnic bias task forces.
As noted above, women's credibility is often challenged, especially
when claims of sexual harassment or rape are made.66 Indeed, im-
bedded in some of the doctrine in these areas of law are implicit
challenges to women's credibility.67 The question is how the rules
of procedure and/or evidence take account of these problems. The
short answer is that thus far, few rules do, but there are pressures
for change-coming not initially from within the judiciary but from
Congress.
This point about process-the source of proposed changes to fed-
eral rules-is in turn a hot topic for proceduralists, today very con-
cerned about the question of what the respective roles of the
Congress, the Judiciary, and the Executive should be in rulemak-
ing.68 In my view, procedure teachers have often understated the
role of Congress in rulemaking and ignored the impact of the De-
partment of Justice. The 1938 Enabling Act did authorize federal
court rule development, but Congress never really ceded all its au-
thority. Congress has upon occasion intervened to change either
civil69 or criminal rules. 70 The most vivid example is the 1990 Civil
Justice Reform Act, in which Congress profoundly altered the
rulemaking framework by authorizing local district courts to de-
velop their own civil justice plans, which may include variations on
the national civil rules.71 (In some ways, there are now ninety-four
amateur "advisory committees on the. civil rules.") In 1991, we also
saw the Executive attempting, by what has come to be known as the
"Quayle Commission" (the President's Council on Competitive-
ness, chaired by the then-Vice President), to frame a civil justice "re-
form agenda." In the fall of 1991, President Bush issued an
66. When discussing "domestic" violence, several reports describe how victims are
blamed, are accused of provoking attacks, are treated as though their experiences are
trivial, and are disbelieved. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON
GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 3-5 (Md. 1989); Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender
Fairness in the Courts, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 825, 875-77 (1989); see supra note 38.
67. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 813-16 (1991) (discussing how
the law of sexual harassment follows the pattern of rape law, placing extra burdens on
women's credibility).
68. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in ProceduralJustice, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 375 (1992) (arguing Congress has usurped the judiciary's power in its Civil Justice
Reform Act rules).
69. See, e.g. FED. R. CIV. P. 35 (rule revised by Congress to permit psychologists to
conduct exams of litigants); Pub. L. 100-690, § 7047,102 Stat. 4101 (1988).
70. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, Sen. Rep.
No. 95-354 (Congress modified a judicial revision of Rule 6(e), governing disclosure of
grand jury proceedings); see Pub. L. No. 95-78, 91 Stat. 319 (1977).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 473 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
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Executive Order, requiring the lawyers within the Department of
Justice to adopt particular stances to various of the federal rules.72
The questions proceduralists must ask are about what to make of
the politics of rulemaking. Which branch should take the lead or
should the tasks always be shared? Should the answers depend on
the context? One way to explore these issues is to identify when
Congress has become involved and what has sparked its interest. A
current example comes (again) from sections of the Violence
Against Women Act, which would amend civil and criminal eviden-
tiary rules and change the availability of interlocutory appellate re-
view on certain evidentiary issues.73 The federal judiciary's
reluctance to pay attention to women's issues in litigation may
prompt congressional action.
Women and jurisdiction, women in courtrooms and in the courts
as institutions of public employment, women in the Federal Rules-
all provide material for proceduralists to explore. We have a grow-
ing understanding of the ways in which women, as users of proce-
dure and as participants, sometimes have unique experiences. Work
by the National Association of Women Judges, the National Judicial
Education Program of the National Organization of Women, and
gender bias task forces across the country has led the way for those
of us who teach procedure to have thick, detailed reports on courts
as places in which gender is all too relevant.
But those of us who teach procedure know that courts are but a
piece of the story we have to tell our students. The world of adjudi-
cation is much broader, some might say fragmenting. The Ameri-
can Association of Law Schools has a section on Litigation, another
on Federal Courts, another on Alternative Dispute Resolution, in
addition to the Section on Procedure with its subcommittee, de-
voted to "complex litigation." Feminist proceduralists should well
ask how these sections interrelate. Are we creating a hierarchy in
which "complex litigation" is perceived as the more sophisticated
material, and the litigation that is one-on-one (like cases that might
be filed, were the Violence Against Women Act ever to become law)
perceived as "simple litigation"? I would rather we talk about large
scale and small scale litigation, and thereby leave open the possibil-
ity that "complexity" may come in all kinds of cases.74
Feminist issues abound not only in how we name the phenome-
non, but where decisionmaking power, both visible and invisible
72. Exec. Order No. 12778,3 C.F.R. 359 (1991).
73. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. Title I, §§ lSI-54 (1993); S. IS, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. Title I, §§ 151-54 (1991).
74. See Housekeeping, supra note 4.
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reside. The so-called "small" cases are increasingly sent to adminis-
trative adjudication, as well as to arbitration and other alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms. We must ask: How does gender
operate in the world of administrative adjudication and in alterna-
tive dispute resolution? Feminists remind us not to celebrate adju-
dication;75 and feminists also remind us to worry about alternative
dispute resolution. 76 What feminism also teaches is to be suspicious
of constructions of the "other"-here of either adjudication or al-
ternative dispute resolution as so radically different from each
other. My own sense is that these processes share more than they
diverge, and the gender bias problems will affect them similarly."
As we teach about procedure, rules, doctrine, courts, judges, and
processes of all kinds, we need to infuse our discussion with a con-
sciousness that the litigants are not relatively anonymous actors who
only have last names in captions of cases, but rather are women and
men in need of our attention. We who teach about procedure need
to teach about the effects of gender on procedure and about the
effects of procedure on the construction of gender.
75. See Carrie M. Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering
Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39 (1985); White, supra note 38.
76. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangersfor Women, 100 YALE LJ.
1545 (1991).
77. For example, demographic study of women as professional mediators indicates
that, like women judges, women mediators tend to be in the lower echelons of their
profession. See CHRISTINE HARRINGTON &JANET RIFKIN, THE GENDER ORGANIZATION OF
MEDIATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEMINIZATION OF LEGAL PRACTICE (Wis. 1989) (series
4-2) (also detailing that of program directors, women are concentrated in family and
consumer disputes and not in large environmental or commercial cases).
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ApPENDIX: REPORTS ON GENDER, RACIAL, AND ETHNIC BIAS IN THE
COURTS (As OF APRIL, 1993)
I. RACE AND ETHNIC BIAS TASK FORCE REPORTS
FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS
AND TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (D.C. 1992).
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMMISSION, "WHERE THE INJURED
FLY FOR JUSTICE" Vol. 1 (Fla. 1990).
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMMISSION, "WHERE THE INJURED
FLY FOR JUSTICE," Vol. 2 (Fla. 1991).
FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON
RACIAL/ETHNIC ISSUES IN THE COURT (Mich. 1989).
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON MINORITY CON-
CERNS, INTERIM REPORT (NJ. 1989).
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON MINORITY CON-
CERNS, FINAL REPORT (NJ. 1992).
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINOR-
ITIES (N.Y. 1991):
Volume One: Executive Summary
Volume Two: The Public and The Courts
Volume Three: Legal Education
Volume Four: Legal Profession, Nonjudicial Officers, Employees
and Minority Contractors
Volume Five: Appendix: Staff Reports and Working Papers
MINORITY AND JUSTICE TASK FORCE, STATE OF WASHINGTON: FINAL
REPORT (Wash. 1990).
II. GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE REPORTS
A. Federal Reports
NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, PRELIMINARY REPORT:
DISCUSSION DRAFT AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1992).
B. State Reports
ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN THE COURTS,
THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (Cal. 1990).
GENDER &jUSTICE IN THE COLORADO COURTS, COLORADO SUPREME
COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, (Colo. 1990).
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REPORT OF THE CONNECTICUT TASK FORCE, GENDER, JUSTICE, AND
THE COURTS (Conn. 1991).
FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS
AND TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (D.C. 1992).
REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY
COMMISSION (Fla. 1990).
GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS: A REPORT TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF GEORGIA BY THE COMMISSION ON GENDER BIAS IN THE ju-
DICIAL SYSTEM (Ga. 1991).
ACHIEVING GENDER FAIRNESS: DESIGNING A PLAN TO ADDRESS
GENDER BIAS IN HAWAII'S LEGAL SYSTEM, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc
COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS (Haw. 1989).
REPORT OF THE FAIRNESS AND EQ.UALITY COMMITTEE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO (Idaho 1992).
THE 1990 REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS
IN THE COURTS (Ill. 1990).
REPORT OF THE INDIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON
WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION (Ind. 1990).
REPORT OF THE KANSAS BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON THE STA-
TUS OF WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION (Kan. 1992).
KENTUCKY TASK FORCE ON GENDER FAIRNESS AND THE COURTS,
EQ.UALjUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN (Ky. 1992).
LOUISIANA TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS: FINAL REPORT
(La. 1992).
MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE, GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS (Md. 1989).
REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT (Mass. 1989).
FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON
GENDER ISSUES IN THE COURTS (Mich. 1989).
REPORT OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE FOR GEN-
DER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS (Minn. 1989).
JUSTICE FOR WOMEN: FIRST REPORT OF NEVADA SUPREME COURT
TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (Nev. 1989).
REPORT OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON
WOMEN IN THE BAR (N.H. 1988).
THE FIRST YEAR REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK
FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS (NJ. 1984).
THE SECOND REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK
FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS (NJ. 1986).
FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW MEXICO STATE BAR TASK FORCE ON
WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (N.M. 1990).
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REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS
(N.Y. 1986).
FINAL REPORT OF THE RHODE ISLAND COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN
THE COURTS: FINAL REPORT ON GENDER BIAS (R.I. 1987).
UTAH TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE UTAH
JUDICIAL COUNCIL (Utah 1990).
GENDER AND JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE VERMONT TASK FORCE ON
GENDER BIAS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM (Vt. 1991).
FINAL REPORT OF THE WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER
AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS (Wash. 1989).
WISCONSIN EQ.UAL JUSTICE TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT (Wis.
1991).
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